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Abstract 
This discussion of the ECJ in the context of a project on political representation in the EU 
responds to the Court’s changing functions in the integration process and also to the critique 
which the exercise of this function has provoked in recent years after the Court objected to 
constitutional provisions and legislation of constitutional status in particular in the sphere of 
labour law and social protection. The ECJ has been accused of partisanship with a neoliberal-
monetarist agenda. These debates are bound to extend to the new functions which were 
assigned to the CJEU in the supervision of the budgetary discipline of Member States in the 
Euro zone. The problems that might arise in such a case have been foreshadowed by the 
recent jurisprudence on the legality of the European practices of crisis management. The 
judgments of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 September 1212 on the ESM Treaty 
and the Fiscal Compact and the CJEU Judgment of 27 November 2012 in the Pringle case are 
of exemplary importance. They document the difficulties both courts have with the defense of 
the autonomy of law against apparent functional necessities and concurring attitudes in the 
readiness to accept the primacy of the political. 
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Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism 
in Europe after the Financial Crisis? 
 
I. Ceding the Constitution to the Political Guardian? 
The issue and problem of ‘constitutional guardianship’ is one with a long 
history. It was answered starkly and infamously by Carl Schmitt during and 
with regard to the final, crisis-ridden, years of the Weimar Republic: The 
guardian of the Constitution is not the Reichsgericht, the judicial branch, but 
the Reichspräsident, a political actor exercising the quasi dictatorial powers 
defined in Article 48 of the Weimar constitution on behalf of a politically 
homogeneous Volk.1 This particular understanding of constitutional 
guardianship has now re-achieved a disquieting degree of topicality within a 
crisis ridden European Union. This dimension of our topic will be discussed 
in more details in the second part of our contribution. We begin, however, 
with a series of reflections on the issue of constitutional guardianship within 
the Union in less fraught times. Even prior to crisis, the problem was highly 
troublesome, albeit that very few commentators, and even fewer institutional 
actors, recognised the true nature of the challenge. Nevertheless, this 
challenge is now becoming ever more apparent in step with a growing and 
critical awareness of deeply entrenched – even growing – diversity within 
Europe and the obviously paradoxical nature of a voluntaristic response to 
diversity, which is ever more insistent in its pursuit of a future unity, but 
which cannot explain how this project might be realized through democratic 
processes.  
                                                        
1 Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1931. 
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When set against this background, the relevance of our topic to a context of 
debate upon democratic representation should be obvious. To be sure, courts, 
generally-speaking, are the non-majoritarian vanguard institutions par 
excellence of constitutional democracies. Non-partisanship defines their very 
ethos. Nevertheless, Constitutional courts, in particular, do not find their 
prestige and authority exclusively within the legal provisions of the 
Constitutions that establish them. Typically, these provisions do not endow 
them with powers of enforcement. Instead, constitutional courts rely and 
build upon a Weberian legitimacy, which they acquire to a significant degree 
through the modes in which they articulate and thereby ‘represent’ both the 
normed character, as well as, the normative dignity of the order in which they 
are situated and operate. In other words, constitutional legitimacy is founded 
within a tense duality of rule-bounded, but socially responsive adjudication. 
This twofold – formal and social – embeddedness of constitutional courts 
presents its own very particular problems within a European constellation, 
and impacts – as we shall demonstrate – cumulatively upon the issue of the 
constitutional guardianship of the EU. The European Union is, as the 
Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon and numerous of its Articles assure us,2 
committed to human rights, freedom, equality, democracy and the rule of 
law. Adherence to these commitments is a condition for membership within 
the Union; at least in theory. Constitutional adjudication came later to Europe 
than to America, but is nonetheless one which has gained the status of a 
common European heritage. How, however, might this legacy be understood 
in the context of the sui generis Union with its multi-level system of 
governance? Which institution is in a position to exercise the function of 
constitutional guardianship within such a constellation? Certainly, the 
ECJ/CJEU springs immediately to mind. But that conclusion would be 
                                                        
2 Most emphatically in Article 21(1) TEU. 
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premature and far too superficial. The European Court has never been 
formally established as a ‘constitutional’ body. To be sure, its foundational 
jurisprudence on direct effect and supremacy, the Cassis-jurisprudence and its 
aftermath, its characterisation of the Treaties as a ‘constitutional charter,’3 
presupposes and assumes important supervisory function for law ‘at all levels 
of governance,’ which are widely recognised by the courts and authorities of 
many jurisdictions and with great emphasis and near unanimity in European 
law scholarship. However, this power cannot be considered to be 
comprehensive, even in theory, as long as ‘Union competences are governed 
by the principle of conferral.’4 Equally, its validity will be doubted for as long 
national constitutional courts – most notably Germany’s 
Bundesverfassungsgericht – refuse to make use of the preliminary reference 
procedure and continue to question the authority of the  by determining 
unilaterally whether European prerogatives are being lawfully asserted. In 
other words, constitutional guardianship within the Union cannot yet be 
regarded as having been entrusted to one single body. It has both national 
and European masters: masters who may be in disagreement with one 
another. 
This insight is neither new, nor particularly disquieting per se. It was 
discussed particularly thoroughly by Neil MacCormick5 a good while ago. 
There is pluralism in Europe, he acknowledged – adding that wise solutions 
could and should be found where legal solutions are not conceivable.6 
MacCormick’s suggestions seem to anticipate what various Courts, including 
the notoriously inconvenient Bundesverfassungsgericht have learned to do, 
namely to establish interactive modes of adjudication. These adjudicative 
modes have by now been doctrinally refined by a host of academic 
                                                        
3 Opinion 1/91, European Economic Area, [1991] ECR I-6079 
4 Article 5(1) TEU. 
5 ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’, Oxford J Legal Studies (1998) 18(3): 517-532  
6 At 531. 
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commentators.7 We will not explore the theoretical premises and practical 
accomplishments of these responses in any further depth,8 however, returning 
instead to the earlier conceptualisation of the multiple-guardian problem 
constellation as a contest for mastery over the Kompetenz-Kompetenz (II). We 
suggest that the conceptualisation of constitutional guardianship under this 
heading has, if inadvertently, disclosed a constellation of diversity in the 
Union which should not and cannot be dealt with through a form of 
hierarchical ordering, but instead requires horizontal cooperation.  
The continuity which we reconstruct is a promising signal as it indicates that 
a potential exists to cope constructively with Europe’s diversity. In Section III, 
where we consider the various European transformations following financial 
crisis, we will document responses to Europe’s troubles of a different kind. 
The pragmatically legalised comitas among European courts, which 
proponents for interactive conflict resolution advocate, has now given way to 
a new primacy of the ‘Political’ in the Union sensu Schmitt. In Section IV we 
will investigate the efforts of the judiciary to manage these transformations. 
We analyse the judicial actions of the usual suspects in relation to two 
Judgments of exemplary importance. Both the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC) and the CJEU retain their specific style. But these differences 
now contrast markedly with their agreement in re. Both courts appear to be 
prepared to accede to the primacy of the Political; they concur in their de-
legalisation of constitutional adjudication.  
 
                                                        
7 See, e.g., L. Viellechner, ‘Constitutionalism as a Cipher: On the Convergence of Constitutionalist 
and Pluralist Approaches to the Globalization of Law’, (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law, 599-623; M.-S. Kuo, ‘Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is Judicial Dialogue 
the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal Landscape?’, Warwick School of Law 
Research Paper No. 2013/06. 
8 Although some authors take a more sociological approach to commentary on the historic ECJ. 
See, M. Everson and J. Eisner, The Making of the European Constitution: Judges and Lawyers in the 
Constitutive Moment, Routledge-Cavendish: London (2007). 
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II. Kompetenz-Kompetenz in a Non-unitary Union?  
Our argument in the following section departs from prevailing modes of 
European legal scholarship in a twofold manner: failing to trumpet the 
historical merits of the ECJ, it likewise appears to question them. Belief in the 
centrality of law and its judicial enforcement was constitutive for legal 
scholarship during the formative era of the integration project. Law was 
prominently presented as both ‘the object and the agent’ of European 
integration.9 In that vision, the ECJ necessarily figured as the incarnation of 
Europe’s integrationist vocation. There is, also, more than a kernel of truth in 
the assertion that the Court’s jurisprudence was to prove, at least to the 
degree that it has withstood political irritations and disagreements. Similarly, 
the historic Court is noteworthy in that it deepened the normative quality of 
European law, in particular in relation to its human rights jurisprudence, and 
mitigated – often successfully – between competing claims and policies, all 
the while managing to build up an unquestioned authority. Today, however, 
the court is no longer portrayed so enthusiastically, even by the most faithful 
of its supporters.10 How could any judicial institution cope with the ever 
increasing complexity and growth of its workload and continue to convince 
national legal systems throughout an ever more diverse Union with its one-
size-fits-all philosophy? How might it hope ever to convince with its highly 
formalistic style of reasoning in cases of fundamental conflict which are 
characterised by conflicting economic interests and political disagreement? 
The Court’s labour law judgements in Viking, Laval and Rüffert,11 which 
                                                        
9 R. Dehousse and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The legal dimension’, in: William Wallace (ed), The Dynamics of 
European Integration, London: Pinter, 1990, 242-60, 243. 
10 Suffice it here to point to the introductory chapter of M. Dawson, B. de Witte and E. Muir in 
their volume on Judicial Activism in the European Court of Justice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
2013, 1-11. 
11 C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan und 
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assigned supremacy to economic freedoms over national labour law 
traditions, provide the most spectacular example of this type of failure.12  
Currently, the factual erosion of the Court’s legitimacy is similarly converging 
with the on-going, if widely unnoticed, transformation of the integration 
project and the ever more insistent conflict constellations that surround it. An 
uncompromising defence of the former authority of the Court has become 
both factually and normatively implausible. The once quite belligerent contest 
between the German constitutional court,13 on the one hand, and the allies of 
the ECJ, on the other,14 has lost its intensity and very provocative nature.15 It is 
now largely evident that there can be no one and single guardian of 
constitutionalism in the Union. The insistence of the ‘Kirchhof’ Court, in the 
course of its infamous Maastricht Judgment, on a cooperative relationship 
(‘Kooperationsverhältnis’) with the ECJ tells us much about the willingness of 
national judiciaries to engage with Europe, albeit as equal partners. By the 
same token, any effort to construe such constitutional dialogue as on-going 
disobedience can only be substantiated with reference to the untranslatable 
German dichotomy between Staatenbund and Verfassungsverbund. There is 
nonetheless both irony and tragedy in this insight. While pragmatic responses 
to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz issue have become imaginable, the transformation 
                                                                                                                                                              
Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, [2007], ECR I-11767; C-346/06, Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert v Land 
Niedersachsen, [2008], ECR I-01989. 
12 See our critique: C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social 
Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, 
(2009) 15:1 European Law Journal, 1–19; M. Everson, ‘From Effet Utile to Effet Neoliberal: Why is 
the ECJ Hazarding the Integrity of European Law?’, in C. Joerges and T. Ralli (eds.), European 
Constitutionalism without Private Law - Private Law without Democracy, ARENA Report 
3/11/RECON Report No 14, Oslo 2011, 37-54. 
13 See in particular Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92 and 
2 BvR 2159/92, 89 BVerfGE 155 (1993) [Brunner v European Union Treaty, CMLR 57 (1994) 1]. 
14 Most prominently, J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, 
Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’, (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 219-258. 
15 See, I. Pernice, Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, (2201) 60 Veröffentlichungen 
der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer, 163 ff.; F.C. Mayer, ‘Wer soll Hüter der 
europäischen Verfassung sein?’, (2004) 129 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 411-435; cf., 
previously, idem, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung, Munich: C.H. Beck 2000, 323 
ff. 
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of the European constellation through the financial crisis is eroding the 
prospects for a legal re-conceptualisation of Europe’s diversity. The crisis, we 
will submit, is establishing a new de-legalised primacy of the Political in the 
Union in which constitutional adjudication is losing it disciplining functions.  
 
III. Crisis ‘Law‘16 
Current responses to the financial crisis depart significantly from European 
law and governance as we once knew it. One extraordinary feature of 
Europe’s new activism is its intensity. Crisis summits have become routine 
and the drafting of ever more ersatz-legislation, or ‘Ersatzunionsrecht’ 
(international law substituting European Union law)17, memoranda and 
policy papers is breath-taking.18 Comprehensive accounts are available.19 
Here, we will restrict ourselves to a few highlights: 
In March and May 2010, respectively, the Commission developed the ‘Europe 
2020 strategy’20 and the ‘European Semester’21; followed in June 2010 by the 
EFSF Framework Agreement22 and in March 2011 by the European Council’s 
                                                        
16 The following passages draw on C. Joerges, ‘The European Economic Constitution and its 
Transformation through the Financial Crisis’, in Dennis Patterson and Anna Södersten (eds.), A 
Companion to European Union law and International Law, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell (forthcoming 
2013). 
17 That term, coined by a German lawyer, was taken up in the ESM judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court (note 41 infra) at para. 226 to denote the resort to international law for 
measures which European law does not foresee. 
18 For continuously updated information see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-
releases/economic-and-financial-affairs?lang=en&BID=93.  
19 E.g., M. Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’, (2011) 48 Common 
Market Law Review, 1777-1806; P. Craig, ‘Financial Crisis, Response, and Europe’s Future’, in 
idem, The Lisbon Treaty, 2nd paperback edition, Oxford: OUP 2013, 457-517 (forthcoming). 
20 Communication from the Commission of 3 March 2010, COM(2010) 2020 final. 
21 Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2010, COM(2010) 250 final. 
22 Confirmed in the conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 17 June 2010, EUCO 13/10, CO 
EUR 9, CONCL 2. The Framework Agreement was concluded by the ECOFIN Council and 
confirmed by the European Council, Brussels on 17 June 2010. 
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‘Euro Plus Pact.’23 Simultaneously, on the basis of the simplified revision 
procedures laid down in Article 48 Paragraph 6 TEU, the European Council 
also decided, on 25 March 2011, to add a new Paragraph 3 to Article 136 TFEU 
permitting the establishment of a stability mechanism and the granting of 
financial assistance, effective as of 1st January 2013.24 This was followed in 
November 2011 by a bundle of legislative measures aimed at reinforcing 
budgetary discipline on the part of Member States. The package is supposed 
to go down in history under the catchy title ‘Six Pack’ and entered into force 
on 13th December 2011.25 The definite high point and cornerstone of the 
whole new edifice is the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(TSCG), drafted in December 2011, approved at an informal meeting of the 
European Council on 30th January 2012,26 and signed on 2nd March 2012 by 
25 out of 27 Member States. A debt brake, designed according to the German 
model, will be introduced and will be subject to judicial review by the CJEU 
in the form of institutional borrowing, with one Member State bringing action 
against another. Support from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a 
permanent crisis fund, will be available only to countries in the euro area that 
have signed the pact. In March 2013 the ‘Two Pack’ submitted back in 2011 
was adopted with parliamentary blessing; it entered into force on 30 May 
2013.27  
                                                        
23 Conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 24/25 March 2011, EUCO 10/11, CO EUR 6, 
CONCL 3 (Annex I). 
24 Dec 2011/199/EU amending Art 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for Member 
States whose currency is the euro, OJ 2011, L 91/2011, 1. 
25 The five regulations 1173-1177/2011/EU and directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011, OJ L 
91/2011, 1. 
26 Cf., the Communication of the euro area Member States as well as the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the version of 20 January 
2012, http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf. 
27 The ‘Two-Pack’ provides for ‘enhanced monitoring and assessment of draft budgetary plans of 
euro area member states, with closer monitoring for those in an excessive deficit procedure, and 
furthermore enhanced surveillance of euro area member states that are experiencing or 
threatened with serious financial difficulties, or that request financial assistance’; for details see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20130312IPR06439/20130312I
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There is much to scrutinise here: legal problems as well as the way they are 
dealt with in legal scholarship. We will restrict our discussion here to the 
particular form of authoritarian crisis management, which the new machinery 
has established. This managerialism is delicate for three inter-dependent 
reasons. First, through the supervision and control of imbalances, it 
disregards the principle of enumerated powers, and, by the same token, 
disrespects the democratic legitimacy of national institutions, in particular, 
the budgetary powers of parliaments. Secondly, in its departure from the one-
size-fits-all philosophy orienting European integration in general and 
monetary policy in particular, it nonetheless fails to achieve a variation, which 
might be founded in democratically legitimated choices; quite to the contrary, 
the individualised scrutiny of all Member States is geared to the objective of 
budgetary balances and seeks to impose the necessary accompanying 
discipline. Under the conditions of monetary unity, the Member States can 
only respond to pertinent requests through austerity measures: reductions of 
wage levels and of social entitlements. Thirdly, the machinery of the new 
regime with its individualised measures which are oriented only by 
necessarily indeterminate general clauses, is regulatory in its nature, 
establishing a ‘political administration’ outside the realm of democratic 
politics and the form of accountability which the rule of law demands.28 
Dariusz Adamski was among the first to highlight and underline that core 
concepts used by new economic governance cannot be defined with any 
precision, either by lawyers or by economists, and are therefore not 
justiciable.29 This implies that rule-of-law and legal protection requirements 
                                                                                                                                                              
PR06439_en.pdf and the recent Memorandum of the European Commission of 27 May 2013: 
MEMO/13/457, available at  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-457_en.htm. 
28 See, for a more positive account, D. Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and the Need 
for a European Law of Struggle’, (2012) 18 European Law Journal, 667-693; but see also his 
‘European Restatements of Sovereignty’, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 10/2013. 
29 Cf., his ‘Europe’s (Misguided) Constitution of Economic Prosperity’, paper presented at the 
conference ‘Crise et droit économique’, organised by the Association Internationale de Droit 
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are being suspended. This type of de-legalisation is accompanied by a highly 
discretionary evaluation of Member States performance, which economist 
Andrew Watt has revealed in his analysis of an in-depth review of thirteen 
EU countries considered to have macroeconomic imbalances undertaken by 
the Commission.30 It is worth noting that the Fiscal Compact provides that, if 
the Commission reports non-compliance of a Contracting Party with Article 
3(2), one or more Contracting Parties may bring this matter to the CJEU. The 
Court is hence not expected to determine whether a budget is “balanced”, 
“structurally balanced” or “exceptional circumstances” prevail. which justify 
temporary deviations as defined in Article 3 1. TSCG). That would constitute 
an impossible mission. But precisely for that reason one must wonder what 
the effect may be of  the entrustment of the Court with the task of assessing 
the proper incorporation of the rules set out in that provision into national 
law. And how likely is it that the Contracting Parties will engage in such 
unfriendly activities?31  
What is specific about Europe’s new economic governance? Characterisations 
by commentators oscillate between notions such as ‘Executive Federalism”32, 
‘Distributive Regulatory State’,33 ‘Consolidating State‘,34 ‘Authoritarian 
Managerialism’35, ‘New Sovereignty with Unfettered Power of Rule’36. They 
                                                                                                                                                              
Economique and the Law Faculty of the University of Wroclaw, Poland, on 8-9 November 2012 in 
Wroclaw (on file with C. Joerges) and previously, id., National power games and structural 
failures in the European macroeconomic governance, (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review, 
1319-1364. 
30 A. Watt, ‘Commission Makes a Mockery of Imbalance Procedure’, Social Europe Journal of 19 
April 2013, available at http://www.social-europe.eu/author/andrew-watt/ 
31 See the critique of D. Chalmers at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/07/european-
court-of-justice-enforcer/. 
32 J. Habermas, ‘A Pact for or against Europe?’, in U. Guérot and J. Hénard (eds.), What does 
Germany Think about Europe?, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, 83-89. 
33 D. Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and the Need for a European Law of Struggle’, 
n. 28 above. 
34 W. Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus , Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2013, Ch. III. 
35 C. Joerges and M. Weimer, ‘A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?’, 
Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2012/7 , Maastricht 2013. 
36 D. Chalmers, ‘European Restatements of Sovereignty’, n. 28. above.  
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all acknowledge the design failures of EMU as it was institutionalised by the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Stability Pact of 1997.37 They all conclude 
that compliance with that poorly designed framework would have disastrous 
consequences. Does that mean that the new regime of an ersatz-law does in 
‘deserve recognition’? Both the FCC and the CJEU have wrestled with this 
problem – but neither appears to have mastered it.  
 
IV. The Law or the Political as Constitutional Guardian 
The German Constitutional Court has a much contested record with respect to 
its European commitments and loyalty – even though signals of disobedience 
have always remained rhetorical. The ECJ has overruled national law in 
countless cases – but has hardly ever found European legal acts to be at fault. 
Investigating each of these Courts against the background of the new 
economic governance now evolving within Europe accordingly promises to 
provide us with nuanced insights into the management of the crisis. 
 
IV.1 Is the German Court a ‘Dog that Barks and never Bites”?38  
The attention which the complaints before the FCC against the ESM Treaty 
and the Fiscal Compact have attracted is as unsurprising as the outcome of 
this controversy which the court delivered in its judgment of 12 September 
                                                        
37 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 209 , 02/08/1997, 6. 
38 The metaphor is from J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The “Lisbon Urteil” and the Fast Food Culture’, (2009) 20 
European Journal of International Law, 505-9, 505, commenting on Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
judgment of 30 June 2009, available at:  www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de; English 
translation at: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
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2012.39 What the highest judicial authority of Europe’s most potent economy 
has to say about well-argued complaints matters. And yet, it was easy to 
‘hazard a pretty good guess at the ending’. Paul Craig’s observation concerns 
the Pringle Case of the CJEU40 but is equally valid with respect to the German 
case. It seemed simply inconceivable that the courts would interfere with high 
politics in matters of utmost importance. That, however, is not good enough a 
reason to close the academic files and shrug of the shoulders.  
On closer inspection, the Judgment reveals a number of ambivalences. The 
most important one is the Court’s defence of the budgetary power of the 
German Bundestag. This power is a democratic essential, protected by the 
eternity clause of the Basic Law. Its importance was already underlined in the 
previous Judgment on the rescue package for Greece41 and its validity cannot 
be questioned in principle. Is it a principle with bite? In both judgments, the 
Court underlined that the Bundestag enjoyed wide latitude which the judiciary 
must respect.42 Through this move, the rights of the Bundestag were re-defined 
in a proceduralising mode: the Parliament must be adequately informed, 
enabled to deliberate, and prevented from delegating its evaluation. This 
reading is in line with a principle of ‘integration responsibility’43 which the 
Court developed in its Lisbon judgment; a contested notion, but one which 
can, in our view, be understood as a search for a response to the tensions 
between integration and democracy. Such a benevolent reading is not evinced 
by the 12th September Judgment. To be sure, the form of judicial restraint, 
                                                        
39 An incomplete English translation is available at:  
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html. 
40 See his ‘Guest Editorial: Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology’, (2013) 20 
Maastricht Journal of European Law, 3-11 (forthcoming).  
41 FCC, Judgment of 7 September 2011, 2 BvR 987/10 - 2 BvR 1485/10 - 2 BvR 1099/10 – aid 
measures for Greece and against the euro rescue package; available at  
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr098710en.html. 
42 See FCC, judgment of 7 September 2011, previous note, para.s 130-132 and judgment of 12 
September 2012, n. 38, para. 180. 
43 FCC, judgment of 30 June 2009, available at: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de; English 
translation at: 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
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which the German court exercised when it gave the green light to the 
extensive indebtedness of the Federal Republic, is again embedded in 
procedural and institutional notions. The Court is not careful of ‘foreign’ 
concerns. The weight constitutionally placed upon the budgetary powers of 
the Bundestag, so we learn and understand, requires that the German 
Parliament retains the power to determine the most important conditions for 
future successful demands for capital disbursements.44 In this passage, the 
Court once again strengthened the link between the Bundestag’s budgetary 
responsibility and a distinctly German philosophy of stability (i.e., price 
stability and the independence of the ECB above all). As a consequence, the 
nature of the EMU as a stability community (Stabilitätsgemeinschaft) is even 
seen as being protected by the ‘eternity clause’ of Article 79 (3) of the German 
Basic Law as an unamendable core of Germany’s constitutional identity.45 
After this move, the stability principles become the core of a refurbished 
European economic constitution.46 All this, the Court hopes, will protect the 
democratic rights of German citizens. Non-German citizens of the Union, 
however, should not at all be amused. Why is budgetary autonomy not 
understood as a common European constitutional legacy, respect for which 
might surely be argued to be deducible from the respect paid to national 
                                                        
44 Para. 274; this section is not yet translated. The official translation is still incomplete. In view of 
the complexity and importance of this pronouncement, we add the German original: ‘Da der 
Bundestag durch seine Zustimmung zu Stabilitätshilfen den verfassungsrechtlich gebotenen 
Einfluss ausüben und Höhe, Konditionalität und Dauer der Stabilitätshilfen zugunsten 
hilfesuchender Mitgliedstaaten mitbestimmen kann, legt er selbst die wichtigste Grundlage für 
später möglicherweise erfolgende Kapitalabrufe nach Art. 9 Abs. 2 ESMV;’ for a critical comment, 
see C. Joerges, ‘Der Berg kreißte - gebar er eine Maus? Europa vor dem 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’, (2012) 65 WSI-Mitteilungen, 560. 
45 Para. 220, which reads in German: ‘Die haushaltspolitische Gesamtverantwortung des 
Deutschen Bundestags wird in Ansehung der Übertragung der Währungshoheit auf das 
Europäische System der Zentralbanken namentlich durch die Unterwerfung der Europäischen 
Zentralbank under die strengen Kriterien des Vertrages über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen 
Union und der Satzung des Europäischen Systems der Zentralbanken hinsichtlich der 
Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank und die Priorität der Geldwertstabilität gesichert.’ And ‘Ein 
wesentliches Element zur unionsrechtlichen Absicherung der verfassungsrechtlichen 
Anforderungen aus Art. 20 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 in Verbindung mit Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG ist insoweit das 
Verbtot monetärer Haushaltsfinanzierung durch die Europäische Zentralbank.’ 
46 See para.s 219-220, 232-233, 239-279, and 300-319. 
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identity by Article 4 (2) TEU? Why should the German Court not be bound to 
respect budgetary powers claimed by other Member States? One does not 
need to resort to European law for such a suggestion but can simply rely on 
constitutional conflicts law.47 The one-sidedness of this argument is all the 
more disappointing as the Court, in an earlier paragraph of its judgment, had 
opened another and more constructive perspective: The Court explained that 
‘Article 79 (3) seeks to protect those structures and procedures which keep the 
democratic process open’.48 The Court did not indicate that it would be 
prepared to address the tensions between democratic commitments and the 
integration process, which would include the concerns of all Member States. 
Instead, the Court’s reasoning leads to a strengthening of the links between 
economic stability and social austerity. This form of judicial self-restraint 
seems even more questionable in the light of – or, rather, in the shadow of – 
the Maastricht judgment discussed above.49 In that judgment, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht had made German participation of Germany in the 
EMU conditional upon the European-wide acceptance of Germany’s 
economic and institutional philosophy. This move is now repeated and 
significantly modified. While the Maastricht judgment assumed that Europe’s 
economic constitution could be an essentially legal project, the new judgment 
is moving from law to governmental and executive managerialism, with 
requirements defined mainly by Germany and its Northern allies. To put it 
slightly differently, we find it deplorable that the FCC acted as (only) the 
guardian of the German constitution. The qualification of financial assistance 
as a matter not of European monetary but of national economic policy,50 as 
well as the somewhat euphemistic statements on the respect of the stability 
                                                        
47 See the seminal essay by H. Bernstein,‘Ein Kollisionsrecht für die Verfassung’, (1965) 19 Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift, 2273-2278. 
48 Para. 206 in the English extract, para. 222 in the German original. 
49 Section IV.1. 
50 Para 169. 
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commitments,51 are anything but robust indicators of truly European 
commitments. They are embedded in the conditionality of existing crisis 
management. The FCC talks about democratic essentials, Jürgen Habermas 
has observed, but has Germany in mind.52 The one-sidedness of its decision 
seems indeed obvious – and difficult to overcome. The German Court is not 
entitled to act as the Guardian of Europe. What we would expect, however, is 
a readiness to define Germany as a Member of a Union in which the concerns 
of all the Member States and their democratic rights deserve recognition. Only 
then would the Court document an understanding, or Integrations-
verantwortung, which might reflect common European commitments.53  
 
IV.2 ‘Lets Close our Eyes’ – No Alternative for the CJEU in Pringle?54 
What would have happened to the European Union had its Court of Justice 
found that Thomas Pringle’s concerns about Europe’s crisis management 
were well founded, that the support-mechanisms which the EFSF and the 
ESM have established interfere with the exclusive European competence for 
monetary policy, that the amendment of Article 136 TFEU were not possible 
under the simplified revision procedure enshrined in Article 48(6) TEU, that 
new policies adopted and pursued by the Member States jeopardised the 
primacy of price stability, that the bail-out provision of Article 125 TFEU 
prohibited the granting of financial assistance to Member States whose 
currency is the Euro, that the functions assumed by the Commission, the ECB, 
and the IWF were irreconcilable with the principles on the conferral of powers 
                                                        
51 Para.s 201 ff. 
52 ‘Drei Gründe für “Mehr Europa’’ (three reasons for ‘more Europe’), Forum Europa, Juristentag, 
Munich, 21 September 2012. 
53 For a similar critique cf., H. Deters, ‘National constitutional jurisprudence in a post-national 
Europe: the ESM ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court’, (2013) 19 European Law 
Journal (forthcoming). 
54 Case C-370/12 Pringle v Ireland, Judgment of 27 November 2012 
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laid down in Article 13 TFEU, or that the mandate allocated to the CJEU in the 
ESM Treaty exceeded judicial powers? Only a fool would dare to predict the 
dire consequences. The same kind of uncertainty governs with regard to the 
success of all of these measures. Under such circumstances, the CJEU could 
not and should not be expected to interfere, one might conclude. Nonetheless, 
in so doing, one must similarly concede that this conclusion implies a 
complete secession of law to discretionary political power. The onus must 
surely be one – for the lawyer at least – to commence the search for 
alternatives to this devastating legal default.  
The search for such alternatives should allow for escape from the impasses to 
which Europe’s crisis managements must respond, namely the design defects 
of EMU, its conceptually monetarist background, upon which the dedication 
of EMU to price stability rests and which has now become the cornerstone 
and sole possible value of the European economic constitution. It has by now 
become a communis opinio that European monetary policy with its pre-defined 
objectives and institutional frameworks cannot operate in tandem with the 
multitude of national actors which are pursuing economic and fiscal policies 
under a very loosely constructed machinery of European supervision. That 
insight has triggered the quests for enhanced controls and generated the new 
machinery of authoritarian managerialism. There is, however, a twofold flaw 
in the reasoning of the CJEU in the assumption that the failures of the past 
justify the unrestrained activism of the present. 
The first flaw is the Court’s failure to address the implications of its own 
explanation of the conceptual background to the bail-out clause. ‘The 
prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU ensures that the Member States 
remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that 
ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. Compliance with 
such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher 
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objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union.’55 
This is indeed a fair restatement of an ordo-liberal legacy which we can still 
identify within EMU. However, the Court is then silent with regard to the 
philosophy which underlies our current cure to the failures of the past. This is 
by no means to suggest that the Court should have advocated an ordo-liberal 
renaissance. Nonetheless, what truly disappoints in its presentation of the 
new modes of economic governance is the lack of any kind of conceptual 
deliberation about their background and their adequacy. As we have argued 
in Section III, the new modes of European economic governance amount to 
nothing less than a deep transformation of the state of the European Union. 
The organisers of that transformation should be asked to explain their 
objectives and the adequacy of the means which they are employing. The lack 
of any plausible explanation of the means-end relationship within Europe’s 
crisis management reveals a second flaw in the judgment. Wherever the court 
responds to objections about the legality of the new regime, it merely parrots 
the orthodoxy of ‘conditionality’ as a justification. 
Conditionality ensures respect for the exclusive European competence in 
monetary policy and thereby legality of the simplified amendment procedure  
[T]he reason why the grant of financial assistance by the stability 
mechanism is subject to strict conditionality under paragraph 3 of 
Article 136 TFEU, the article affected by the revision of the FEU Treaty, 
is in order to ensure that that mechanism will operate in a way that 
will comply with European Union law, including the measures adopted 
by the Union in the context of the coordination of the Member States’ 
economic policies.56  
Conditionality is the glue that keeps transnational actors together:  
                                                        
55 Para. 135. 
56 Para 68 
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[When granting assistance] the ESM ‘Board of Governors shall entrust 
the European Commission – in liaison with the ECB and, wherever 
possible, together with the IMF – with the task of negotiating, with the 
ESM Member concerned, a memorandum of understanding (“MoU”) 
detailing the conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility. 
The content of the MoU shall reflect the severity of the weaknesses to 
be addressed and the financial assistance instrument chosen. In 
parallel, the Managing Director of the ESM shall prepare a proposal for 
a financial assistance facility agreement, including the financial terms 
and conditions and the choice of instruments, to be adopted by the 
Board of Governors.57 
Last, but not least, Article 125 TFEU retains its function thanks to 
conditionality, 
[T]he purpose of the strict conditionality to which all stability support 
provided by the ESM is subject is to ensure that the ESM and the 
recipient Member States comply with measures adopted by the Union 
in particular in the area of the coordination of Member States’ 
economic policies, those measures being designed, inter alia, to ensure 
that the Member States pursue a sound budgetary policy. 
The deeply undemocratic nature of conditionality goes unnoticed or 
uncommented upon. The CJEU imposes on the whole of Europe the form of 
discipline which the FCC has imposed on Germany’s neighbours.  
 
V. De-judicialisation: Europe’s Schmittian Moment  
Germany’s constitutional court feels exclusively committed to the country’s 
constitution. The CJEU is certainly motivated by its commitment to the 
integration project. The discrepancy between these commitments was once 
perceived of as threat to the European project. That risk did not materialise as 
                                                        
57 Para 18. 
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anticipated. But we are now concerned with a risk of a new kind. The 
converging attitudes of both courts in the assessment of the praxis of Europe’s 
crisis management is disquieting because it accepts the primacy of 
discretionary politics in the management of the crisis and fails to develop any 
criteria against which the legitimacy of these practices might be assessed.58 
At this point we return to our reference to the ‘state of exception’ made at the 
beginning of this essay. Schmittian notions are certainly always engraved in a 
specific context. 59 History does not repeat itself and situational contexts 
remain distinct. And yet, recourse to Schmitt is anything but far-fetched.60 
Crisis management practices which are neither foreseen in EU primary law, 
nor in national constitutions are justified with the argument that compliance 
with the letter of the law would cause more harm than its breach or daring 
interpretation. Even Carl Schmitt did not conceive of the state of exception as 
a permanent condition; his justification of a ‘commissarial dictatorship’ 
included an effort to overcome the problems that precipitated departure from 
the rule of law and to regain normal constitutionality.61 In the present state of 
the Union, pertinent suggestions are urgent – and abound. However, they are 
mostly merely pragmatic and managerial, albeit that some constitutional 
                                                        
58 We should underline that we do not object in principle to the FCC’s efforts to insist on 
parliamentary involvement. One can read this tendency as a step towards a proceduralisation 
which seeks to engage concerned institutional ‘stakeholders’ in Europe’s crisis management (see 
O. Lepisus, ‘ESM-Vertrag, Fiskalpakt und das BVerfG’, (2012) 23 Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht, 761-762; see also H. Deters, n. 51 above..  
59 Cf., E. Kennedy, ‘Emergency Government Within the Bounds of the Constitution: An 
Introduction to Carl Schmitt, The Dictatorship of the Reichspresident according to Article 48 R.V’., 
(2011) 18:3 Constellations, .284-297 with references to the German original writings and the 
translations into English. 
60 E.-W. Böckenförde, formerly a judge of the Bundesverfassungsgericht and renowned 
connoisseur of Schmitt’s oeuvre, was among the first to characterise the crisis of the Euro and of 
Monetary Union as an ‘Ausnahmezustand” (state of exception/emergency) which would suspend 
the rule of law: E.-W. Böckenförde; ‘Kennt die europäische Not kein Gebot? Die Webfehler der EU 
und die Notwendigkeit einer neuen politischen Entscheidung’, Neue Züricher Zeitung, 21 June 
2010, available at: 
http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/kultur/literatur_und_kunst/kennt_die_europaeische_not_kein_g
ebot_1.6182412.html. 
61 See Carl Schmitt, ‘Vergleichender Überblick über die neueste Entwicklung des Problems der 
gesetzgeberischen Ermächtigungen (Legislative Delegationen)’, (1938) 6 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 252-267. 
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lawyers and political philosophers have formulated some new propositions 
for a new constitutional architecture.  
We have little room here to enter in these debates. We have presented our 
alternative of ‘conflicts-law as Europe’s constitutional form’ elsewhere.62 This 
is an approach which takes, ‘unity in diversity”, the fortunate motto of the ill-
fated Draft Constitutional Treaty of 2003 seriously, and rejects the notion that 
federalist state building is a sustainable project. We argue instead for a radical 
‘proceduralisation’ of the integration project in which the European judiciary 
engages in continuous juris-generative efforts (a ‘Rechtfertigungsrecht’), which 
seek responses to Europe’s complex conflict constellations.63 Democratisation 
through conflicts-law constitutionalism cannot deliver ready-made responses 
to the financial crisis, but it can nevertheless claim to provide perspectives for 
a return to a constitutional European condition. To substantiate this 
perspective with respect to Pringle: monetary policy, fiscal policy and 
economic policy are assigned to different levels of governance in the Union. 
They are, however, interdependent. In the terminology of the conflicts-law 
approach, this generates ‘diagonal’ conflicts. Their ‘resolution’ within 
Europe’s crisis management is currently occurring through establishment of 
the primacy of ‘the Political’. Conflicts-law constitutionalism, by contrast, 
would require legally structured (‘constitutionalised’) cooperative 
deliberation.  
 
 
                                                        
62 In condensed form the introductory chapter to see the introductory chapter to C. Joerges, P.F. 
Kjaer, T. Ralli (eds.), Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation, (2011) 
2 Transnational Legal Theory (Special Issue) with contributions by A. J. Menéndez, F. Rödl, M. 
Amstutz, P. F. Kjaer, M. Herberg and M. Everson.  
63 See M. Everson and J. Eisner, The Making of the European Constitution, n. 8 above, 13 ff.(22 ff on 
Rechtsverfassungsrecht) and C. Joerges in ‘Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation and Conflicts 
Law as Europe’s Constitutional Form’, LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series (LEQS), 
No. 28, London 2010, revised, 2013. 
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